Analysis of: Apple and Google pledge not to discriminate against third-party apps in UK deal
The Guardian | February 10, 2026
TL;DR
UK regulators secure toothless 'voluntary commitments' from Apple and Google while leaving their 30% app store tax untouched. Platform monopolists write their own rules as the state performs regulation without substance.
Analytical Focus:Contradictions Historical Context Class Analysis
The UK Competition and Markets Authority's agreement with Apple and Google reveals the fundamental contradiction at the heart of capitalist state regulation: the state's structural dependence on capital accumulation limits its capacity to meaningfully constrain that same capital. Despite formally recognizing that these corporations possess 'substantial, entrenched market power'—effectively admitting monopoly status—the CMA opted for voluntary, legally non-binding commitments rather than enforced structural changes. This regulatory theater exemplifies the neoliberal state's approach to platform capitalism: acknowledge market failures rhetorically while preserving the conditions for continued accumulation. The 30% commission that Apple and Google extract from app developers—the primary mechanism of surplus extraction in the platform economy—remains entirely untouched. Meanwhile, the commitments secured address only secondary concerns: transparency in app vetting, non-discrimination in search rankings, and data usage protocols. A former CMA director himself describes these measures as 'so lightweight that it barely exists.' The ideological framing from both corporations and the regulator naturalizes this arrangement as collaborative problem-solving. Apple claims it faces 'fierce competition' despite duopoly control over mobile operating systems, while the CMA celebrates its 'unique flexibility' in securing 'immediate commitments.' This language obscures the class dynamics at play: app developers—many of whom are small businesses or independent workers—remain subject to monopoly rents, while the promise of meaningful reforms like alternative app stores is perpetually deferred. The material reality is that platform gatekeepers continue extracting value from the digital labor of millions while the regulatory apparatus legitimizes rather than challenges this extraction.
Class Dynamics
Actors: Platform monopolists (Apple, Google), App developers (ranging from small independents to larger companies), State regulatory apparatus (CMA), Consumers/mobile phone users, Competition lawyers and professional-managerial class analysts
Beneficiaries: Apple and Google shareholders, Platform corporations maintaining monopoly rents, Regulatory professionals whose careers depend on ongoing oversight, State legitimacy through appearance of market intervention
Harmed Parties: App developers paying up to 30% commission, Consumers bearing passed-through costs, Potential market entrants blocked by platform barriers, Workers whose digital labor generates platform value
The power asymmetry is stark: Apple and Google control access to virtually all UK mobile phone users, giving them structural leverage over both developers and regulators. The CMA possesses formal enforcement powers but chose not to exercise them, revealing how regulatory capture operates not through corruption but through the state's structural position. The voluntary nature of commitments means corporations retain ultimate decision-making power, while the regulator maintains the appearance of oversight. App developers, despite being directly affected, appear only as abstract beneficiaries rather than active participants in shaping these rules.
Material Conditions
Economic Factors: Platform monopoly rents via 30% commission structure, Control over digital distribution infrastructure, Data extraction from third-party applications, Network effects creating barrier to market entry, Digital labor of app developers generating platform value
The app store model represents a quintessential platform capitalism arrangement: Apple and Google own the means of digital distribution while app developers perform the productive labor of creating software. The 30% commission functions as rent extraction—value captured not through productive contribution but through ownership of essential infrastructure. This mirrors historical patterns of landlordism translated into digital space. Developers must submit their labor to platform vetting, accept platform pricing, and operate within platform rules while platforms capture a significant portion of the value created.
Resources at Stake: App store commission revenues (billions annually), User data and behavioral information, Control over mobile software distribution, Access to device features and APIs, Market positioning in digital economy
Historical Context
Precedents: Railroad monopolies and rate regulation in 19th century capitalism, Telecommunications deregulation under neoliberalism, Microsoft antitrust proceedings and consent decrees, EU Digital Markets Act approach to platform regulation, Historical patterns of regulatory capture across industries
This episode fits within the broader historical pattern of monopoly capitalism's relationship with the regulatory state. Just as railroad barons of the Gilded Age eventually accepted nominal regulation that legitimized their market power while preserving profits, today's platform monopolists engage with regulatory processes to shape rules in their favor. The shift from industrial to digital monopoly has not altered this dynamic—it has accelerated it. The neoliberal period (1980s-present) specifically established the template of 'light-touch' regulation that prioritizes market flexibility over structural intervention. The CMA's approach—acknowledging market power while accepting voluntary commitments—represents the mature form of this regulatory philosophy, where the state's role shifts from constraining capital to managing its contradictions.
Contradictions
Primary: The state simultaneously recognizes monopoly power ('substantial, entrenched market power') and refuses to exercise its formal powers to break that monopoly, revealing how the capitalist state cannot fundamentally challenge capital accumulation even when acknowledging its harms.
Secondary: Apple's claim of 'fierce competition' contradicts the CMA's formal finding of market dominance, Voluntary commitments described as regulatory success while being 'not legally binding', Consumer protection rhetoric while leaving consumer-affecting commission untouched, Innovation discourse from platforms whose market power suppresses competitive innovation
These contradictions are unlikely to resolve through the current regulatory framework. The CMA's promise to 'impose formally' if voluntary measures fail creates a cycle of deferred enforcement that preserves platform power. More likely trajectories include: continued regulatory performance without structural change; potential EU regulatory divergence creating pressure; or deeper crisis in app developer profitability forcing more confrontational politics. The fundamental contradiction between social production (millions creating apps) and private appropriation (two corporations extracting rents) will intensify as platform dependency grows, potentially creating conditions for more radical demands around platform cooperativism or public alternatives.
Global Interconnections
This UK regulatory episode connects to a global pattern of states struggling to govern platform capitalism. The EU's Digital Markets Act takes a more interventionist approach, creating regulatory competition that may eventually pressure UK policy. However, both approaches operate within the same fundamental constraint: neither questions the legitimacy of platform monopoly itself, only its most egregious abuses. The US, meanwhile, has seen antitrust cases against both Apple and Google proceed with uncertain outcomes, demonstrating how different capitalist states manage the same contradiction differently while preserving the underlying accumulation model. The concentration of digital infrastructure in US-based corporations also reveals imperialist dynamics in platform capitalism. The UK regulatory process essentially negotiates terms with American capital over access to British consumers and developers. This asymmetry—where core economy platforms extract value from peripheral markets—reproduces classical patterns of unequal exchange in digital form. The 30% commission flowing from UK developers to Silicon Valley represents a form of digital rent that transcends national regulatory frameworks.
Conclusion
This regulatory episode offers a clear lesson in the limits of reformist approaches to platform power. The state's formal recognition of monopoly combined with its practical deference to capital demonstrates why structural transformation cannot emerge from within existing institutional frameworks. For workers in the digital economy—whether app developers, gig workers, or the broader class whose labor and data feeds platform accumulation—the path forward lies not in hoping for regulatory protection but in building collective power. Platform cooperativism, worker organization across the tech sector, and demands for public alternatives to private platforms represent more promising directions than faith in regulatory processes structurally constrained from challenging capital. The contradiction between social digital production and private platform appropriation will only sharpen; the question is whether workers will be organized to exploit that contradiction when it reaches crisis point.
Suggested Reading
- The Age of Surveillance Capitalism by Shoshana Zuboff (2019) Zuboff's analysis of how tech platforms extract value from behavioral data directly illuminates Apple and Google's position as gatekeepers who profit from controlling and monitoring digital activity.
- Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism by V.I. Lenin (1917) Lenin's analysis of monopoly capitalism and finance capital's dominance provides the theoretical foundation for understanding how platform monopolies represent a new phase of the same concentration dynamics.
- Reform or Revolution by Rosa Luxemburg (1900) Luxemburg's critique of reformism's structural limitations explains why regulatory approaches that preserve capitalist property relations cannot fundamentally challenge platform monopoly power.